What will the UK's post-Brexit migration policy look like?

Dr Patrick Pinkerton is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London, and a Module Convenor for Queen Mary Online's MA in International Relations. He has recently published work on UK and German migration policy. In the article below, he considers what migration policy may look like once (or if) the UK exits the European Union.

Division and debate over the UK’s future relationship with the EU is wreaking havoc on the main political parties. This was made clear in the May local elections, in which the Conservatives lost an unprecedented 1,334 counsellors, with Labour failing to make meaningful gains, and is likely to become even more apparent in the 23rd May European elections. Despite this, the Government is still working on the assumption that exit will take place on 31st October 2019. Key to their preparations, driven by a view that migration was central to the Leave campaign’s success, is the development of a future migration policy. So, assuming that Brexit takes place, what will the UK’s ‘post-Brexit’ migration policy look like?

The new regime

In terms of Government plans for the new regime, there are two documents we can examine for clues. In September 2018 the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) published its Government-commissioned report into the impact of migration to the UK from the European Economic Area (EEA, made up of the EU28 plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, citizens of which all enjoy reciprocal freedom of movement), along with their recommendations for future migration policy. Focusing purely on labour migration, the MAC took a highly instrumental, utilitarian approach to this question, with their stated objective being a future system which would “maximise the total welfare of the resident population” (p. 15) of the UK.

This report was notable for quashing some of the myths about the impact of EEA migration on jobs, public services and crime, concluding that the “small overall impacts mean that EEA migration as a whole has had neither the large negative effects claimed by some nor the clear benefits claimed by others” (as stated in the Chair’s Forward). Breaking this down further, the MAC found that high-skilled migrant workers have proved beneficial to public finances, innovation in the economy and (possibly) productivity, and that migration as whole has had a minor positive impact on wages at the upper end of the scale.

At the same time, however, they found that “migration has slightly reduced employment opportunities for the UK-born especially for the lower-skilled”, and some evidence for a small negative impact on earnings at lower wage levels (p 110). These findings led them to the overall recommendation that migration policy should “make it easier for higher-skilled workers to migrate to the UK than lower-skilled workers” (p. 127).

The Government then published its own White Paper on immigration in December 2018. Taking on board the MAC’s recommendation to remove preference for EU citizens, this announced an intention to move to a single points-based migration system after the transition period, which will give “access to highly skilled and skilled workers from all countries” (p. 15). However, the Government parted from the MAC by also proposing to institute, as a transitional measure, “a time-limited route for temporary short-term workers”, which “will allow people to come for a maximum of 12 months” (p. 16).

A two-tier system

If we take a step back here, and look to the longer context of changes to UK migration policy, we can see the importance of this distinction. Between 2008 and 2010, the UK introduced a points-based system for non-EU migrants. Close inspection reveals this to be a system of temporary visas that provide longer lengths of stay, and faster routes to permanent settlement and citizenship, for those with the greatest personal wealth or employed in the highest-earning professions.

The explicit references to factors such as salary and savings tie this visa regime into much wider class, racial, and gender dynamics, by ignoring how access to high earnings or cash reserves are often influenced by nationality or family background, or by promoting a gender-blind notion of ‘minimum salary’ that does not take into account well-documented gender pay gaps.

For those employed in less desirable occupations, or who cannot meet stringent conditions such as earning at least £35,000 per year, the end of the visa period will mean moving on to a third country, or remaining in the UK but crossing from a legitimate residence status to an irregular one, and from the open economy to the shadows (Pinkerton 2018).

The immigration White Paper replicates these hierarchies in the distinction between the two routes specified (p. 44). The first pathway is “for skilled workers entitled to stay longer periods, to bring dependants and in some cases to settle permanently”, and will include fast-track routes for ‘Innovators’, ‘Exceptional Talent’, and ‘Investors’. The second pathway is “for temporary short-term workers at all skills levels… subject to tightly defined conditions” and only “open to migrants from specified low-risk countries”, who will not be eligible for permanent residence status or citizenship. 

Of course, this second route is framed as a ‘transitional measure’, but there are hints in the White Paper (p. 17) that it may not be as temporary as this suggests. The route will be subject to a full review in 2025 (and thus last at least four years, if the transition period starts in 2021), after which time the Government “will work with the MAC, as well as representatives of business and local communities to consider whether there should be any continuing facility for short-term workers to come to the UK”. Even when suggesting that “any future arrangements may be more limited than the transitional route”, there is clear consideration that this ‘transitional measure’ may gain a sense of permanence.

Conclusions

So, what does all this mean for the UK’s ‘post-Brexit’ migration policy? In my view, it suggests that future policy will further entrench the two-tier system already emerging through the current regime. While the wealthiest and most privileged will be attracted with clear routes to permanent residence and citizenship, the lower-skilled will be welcomed on a temporary basis only. It is therefore likely that any ‘post-Brexit’ migration system will fit into the longer-term trends of UK migration policy, where a system of ‘mobile migrants’ is slowly replacing the ‘permanent settler’ model of immigration.

We explore a range of issues relating to migration and mobility, including the importance of border regimes to citizenship, security, and global health, in the first Queen Mary Online MA in International Relations module, ‘Contemporary World Politics: Theories, Concepts, Themes’.