The return of major power war? Polarity and conflict in world politics

Will the changing distribution of power in the international system inevitably lead to war? Read an international relations' scholar's analysis. 

This post is by Dr Haro Karkour, Online Tutor for Queen Mary Online's MA in International Relations and MSc in International Public Policy. Haro's research focuses on International Relations (IR) Theory.

Polarity refers to the distribution of power in the international system. Prominent IR scholars argue that a multipolar world is emerging out of the present unipolar moment. This assumed change leads commentators to assess the likelihood of major power war, for instance with the US and its allies on one side, and Russia and China on the other. Polarity however defines neither foreign policy nor the prospect of peace or conflict in world politics.

Types of polarity

Historically, three types of polarity are commonly theorised. Multipolarity exists when there are three or more powers in the international system with the capacity to tilt the balance of power to such an extent that, in time of war, a shift in an alliance can turn a victory into a defeat and vice versa. Multipolarity existed throughout the eighteenth century, all the way through to 1945.

In a multipolar world, the entry of the United States into the First and Second World Wars meant the difference between victory and defeat for William II and Hitler respectively. After 1945, the system became bipolar, whereby outside the two superpowers, the US and the USSR, no other player in the system was capable of tipping the balance of power by simply joining one side or the other.

With the fall of the USSR, after 1990, the International system became unipolar, whereby no power or combination of powers could defeat America in a major war.

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How polarity impacts conflict

Scholars have theorised the impact of the type of polarity that defines the international system on conflict. Realists disagree on whether it is multipolarity or bipolarity that is more peaceful and stable.

Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, argue that multipolarity leads to caution, given the high uncertainty and the difficulty to calculate risk. Neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, argue that bipolarity is more stable and peaceful, given that there are less players in the system and therefore a reduced risk of misjudgement.

All realists would perceive unipolarity as unstable and unpeaceful, given the absence of the balance of power as a check on the unipole’s appetite for war. Nuno Monteiro goes as far as to argue that unipolarity is inherently unpeaceful, given that it would either engage the superpower in war or, alternatively, if disengaged, encourage other smaller powers to engage in war. A case example of the former is the Iraq War, and of the latter the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990-1991.

The trouble with all aforementioned arguments is the same: historical determinism. Polarity in no way determines what foreign policy or course of action policymakers decide on. Multipolarity may lead to war when policymakers miscalculate; as Germany miscalculated the allies’ and US resolve, twice. Bipolarity can lead to deadly conflicts, such as Vietnam and Afghanistan, and bring superpowers to the brink of a nuclear exchange, such as in Cuba.

The successes and failures in all these instances are successes and failures of policy, not the distribution of power in the international system. Neither Vietnam nor Iraq were inevitable or ordained by a higher power. They were based on decisions.

Multipolarity and the prospect of great power war

If the aforementioned history provides any lessons, whether or not the latest change in polarity would lead to conflict is not inevitable. What is relevant today is the same as it always has been: leadership and decisions.

The assumptions policy makers hold about the world, which enable them to predict the future, matter a great deal. It matters a great deal, for instance, whether NATO sees China as a partner in a future world order or, as issued in a NATO summit Communiqué last year, it regards China as a challenge to the existing order.

It matters a great deal whether policymakers interpret Ukraine on its own terms, or rather as implicated in NATO’s credibility in Asia, particularly Taiwan. ‘Credibility’, after all, was also central in Vietnam, and yet, as a false assumption, led to unnecessary conflict.

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